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Purpose of This Paper
Advocating Student-within-Environment (ASE) theory is grounded in two foundational claims. The first is ontological and epistemological; neither the self nor the environment is a fixed or essential entity, and the two are not separate things that later come into relationship. Self and environment co-arise, and each is non-dual within itself as well as with the other. The second claim pertains to agency. Personal and social agency, including what is customarily called causation and the felt experience of autonomy, is a function and expression of the orientation to experience and the establishment of the complex total of the prior conditions of experience.
When these two claims are placed side by side, some readers suspect a contradiction. If there is no fixed self, then whose orientation is being described? If agency is a function of prior conditions, has ASE theory reinstated a type of determinism where conditions act upon a passive student, which would itself be a dualism (i.e., causes on one side, the person on the other)? And if autonomy is conditioned, is the experience of choosing simply mistaken? The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that the two claims are philosophically consistent. I contend that the second claim is the positive and practical expression of the first. Non-dualism describes what persons and environments are not, namely self-standing substances; the account of orientation and prior conditions describes what they are, namely conditioned processes that contribute to the conditioning of subsequent experience. Considered apart from one another, each claim drifts toward a position that ASE theory has never held.
The Two Claims
Non-Dualism Within Self and Within Environment
ASE theory holds that a student\'s culture, constitution, and circumstance are not external forces acting upon a pre-formed interior life; rather, they are the medium through which selfhood continuously and contingently arises (Lemberger, 2010; Lemberger-Truelove & Bowers Parker, 2024). In kind, the environment is not a stable backdrop but a living relational field that is shaped by the qualities of presence that persons bring to it. This is the reason the theory was named student-within-environment and not student-and-environment.
The claim is stronger than one of interdependence between two things, as non-dualism in ASE theory applies within each pole. Within the self, there is no single, unified interior speaker who owns experience. The self is better described as a dialogue of positions, many of which were first the voices of others (Bakhtin, 1984; Hermans, 2001), and as a pattern of psychophysical processes that holds together over time without an unchanging core. This is consistent with the Buddhist teaching of anatta, wherein what is designated as a self is a conditioned stream of events and not a possessor standing behind them (Siderits, 2007). Within the environment, there is likewise no single or fixed setting. A school is a shifting arrangement of persons, routines, histories, policies, and meanings; the same building is a different environment for a student who is welcomed in it than for a student who is watched in it. The ASE kaleidoscope metaphor was offered to illustrate this very point, in that the colored crystals are real, and yet the pattern that one sees is always a function of their arrangement at a given turn.
It is important to note that non-dualism of this type is not monism, as ASE theory does not suggest that self and environment are one undifferentiated thing. Nor is it eliminativism, as the theory does not suggest that the self is nothing at all. Instead, self and environment are not two independent substances, and the distinctions that we draw between them are functional distinctions drawn within a single relational process. This is the sense of the Madhyamaka phrase \"not-two,\" which denies separation without asserting sameness (Garfield, 1995). An early way that I described this relationship was as a lock and key, with the student as the key and the school environment as the lock; each is needed for the other to open, and when the two fit together (much like a tongue and groove) the interface appears as one.
Agency as Orientation and Prior Conditions
The second claim, which is developed most fully in the ASE theory of change, is that a present moment of experience is the emergence into awareness of conditions already in place. Some of these conditions are carried in the body and in personal history, and others are carried in family, culture, and institution. The experience of choosing arrives with a felt spontaneity, as though it began in that instant, yet the prior conditions have already established the range of what can be experienced and what can be chosen. Moreover, these conditions never arrive bare; they arrive already carrying a direction, or a sense of what is happening, what it means, and what it is for. ASE theory refers to this as the orientation of experience, which includes three registers (i.e., meaning, interpretation, and teleonomic direction).
Two phrases in this claim warrant attention. The first is complex total. Agency is not located in any single condition, whether a will, a gene, a classroom rule, or a history of trauma; it is a function of the whole configuration. The second is establishment. Agency is not limited to the instant of choice, as much of it consists of the arranging, over time, of the conditions that a future moment will inherit. This is consistent with an earlier ASE-related formulation that \"the practice of counseling is the establishment of the prior conditions of indivisible wellness\" (Lenz & Lemberger-Truelove, 2023).
Three Apparent Problems
The suspicion of inconsistency can be expressed as three objections. The first might be called the problem of the ownerless orientation. If the self is not a fixed entity, there seems to be no one to whom an orientation belongs; orientation appears to be something that a subject does, and non-dualism seems to have removed the subject.
The second is the problem of reinstated dualism. To say that agency is a function of prior conditions sounds like a familiar determinism where conditions push and the person is pushed. That picture requires two things, the conditions and the person upon whom they act, and so it would seem that the agency claim brings back the very separation that non-dualism denied.
The third is the problem of illusory autonomy. If choosing is conditioned throughout, then the felt sense of authorship might be dismissed as a story told after the fact about events caused elsewhere (Wegner, 2002). ASE theory, however, maintains that the intuition of selfhood and authorship is genuine and is the necessary ground of commitment.
Each of these objections depends upon an assumption that ASE theory does not make. The sections that follow address them in turn.
Non-Dualism Requires an Account of Conditions
The most basic point is that non-dualism, in the tradition from which ASE theory draws, is not a freestanding denial. It is the negative statement of a positive claim about conditionality. Nāgārjuna identified emptiness, or the absence of independent self-nature, with dependent origination itself; whatever arises dependently is, for that reason, empty of a separate essence (Garfield, 1995). To say that a self is not fixed is already to say that it is conditioned, and to say that it is conditioned is already to say that it is not fixed. Stated otherwise, these are one claim viewed from two vantage points.
If this is so, then ASE theory could not maintain its non-dual ontology without also offering some account of how conditions give rise to experience and action. A non-dual theory that had nothing to say about conditions would be silent on the very matters that concern school counselors, and a silent theory provides the counselor with little to do. The second claim of ASE theory supplies what the first requires, in that it describes what the conditions are (i.e., personal and social, carried as culture, constitution, and circumstance), how they enter the present (i.e., as the emergence of prior conditions into awareness), and how they are taken up (i.e., through orientation). The agency claim is therefore not an addendum to the ontology; it is the ontology described in causal terms.
The Complex Total Is Itself Non-Dual
The objection of reinstated dualism assumes that prior conditions can be sorted cleanly into those outside the person and the person who receives them. ASE theory denies that this sorting can be accomplished without remainder, and the phrase complex total carries this denial.
Mill (1843/1974) argued that the cause of an event, philosophically speaking, is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, which, being realized, the consequent follows. From this view, the habit of naming one condition as the cause and relegating the rest to background is a practical selection made for a purpose and not a feature of the world. Two familiar dualisms in education result from this habit. When a student\'s behavior is explained by her will, effort, or character, one condition has been selected from the total and named as the cause. When the same behavior is explained by her neighborhood, her diagnosis, or her school\'s policies, a different condition has been selected and named as the cause. Voluntarism and environmental determinism are mirror images of one another; both divide the complex total along an inside-outside line and then debate which side is responsible.
ASE theory does not accept this division, and its own conceptual vocabulary makes an inside-outside line difficult to draw. Constitution, which might seem to be the most interior of the 3Cs, is defined in ASE theory as the amalgamation of a person\'s internal qualities and internalized social influences (e.g., family dynamics, cultural and relational priorities). Culture, which might seem to be the most exterior, is carried in the body as habit, in inner speech as the voices of others, and in perception as what a person finds it natural to notice. Circumstance describes the immediate and changeable conditions in which constitution and culture commingle. The three are distinguishable for the purposes of conceptualization, which is why ASE practitioners use them in assessment, but none is purely inside or purely outside the student. The ASE preference for the term governors, as opposed to determinants, signals that these conditions influence experience without functioning as fixed causal ingredients (Lemberger-Truelove & Bowers Parker, 2024).
The complex total of prior conditions, then, is the non-dual field described from the standpoint of causation. When ASE theory suggests that agency is a function of prior conditions, the claim is not that something outside of the person causes what the person does. Rather, what the person does is an expression of a configuration of which the person is a part, and which runs through the person as much as around her.
Orientation and the Question of the Owner
The problem of the ownerless orientation assumes that orientation must be performed by a subject who stands apart from experience and directs it. ASE theory locates orientation differently. Orientation is the manner in which conditions are taken up, or the direction they already carry when they arrive, and not a separate faculty that looks at conditions from somewhere outside of them. A body that has learned vigilance arrives at a classroom already reading the teacher\'s raised voice as threat; a school that has learned to see noncompliance as defiance arrives at a student\'s walkout already reading it as a matter for discipline. In both instances, orientation is a condition in motion, and conditions are orientation that has settled into structure.
One way that I have described the self in this regard is as a compiler and positioner of experience, as opposed to the originator or executor of thoughts (i.e., a thinker before the thoughts). By virtue of existence, and awareness of existence, the self adds to the prior causes. This contribution is accumulative and generative (i.e., non-linear); the self is tethered to the causes but is not the same as them. In this way, both intuitions persist, namely that we are largely determined by biology, social environment, history, and the like, and yet we retain some executive authority over how experience is positioned.
This view is consistent with the Buddhist account of action upon which ASE theory draws. In early Buddhist teaching, action (kamma) is identified with intention (cetanā) and not with a doer who possesses intention (Bodhi, 2012). Buddhaghosa (1991) expressed the point plainly in suggesting that there are deeds but no doer apart from the deeds. This does not suggest that nothing acts, but that acting does not require a separate actor behind the action. The question of whose orientation is being described has an answer, then, although the answer is not a hidden owner. It is this pattern, this stream of conditioned and conditioning events that answers to a student\'s name, remembers yesterday, and anticipates tomorrow.
The teleonomic character of orientation is relevant here as well. Following Pittendrigh and Mayr, a process is teleonomic when its goal-directedness arises from the organization of a living system and not from a fixed destination toward which it is drawn (Mayr, 1974). Orientation in ASE theory is purposive in this sense, as it leans toward ends and can be redirected, yet it does not require an essence that the person was always meant to realize. This keeps the agency claim consistent with the refusal of a fixed self. A fixed telos would require a fixed self to fulfill it, whereas a teleonomic orientation requires only a living pattern, personal and social, capable of revising its own direction.
Determinism and the Separate Self
The objection of reinstated dualism has a further form. Even if the conditions are non-dual, one might argue, the person is still caused, and a caused person is not an agent. The response from ASE theory is that the threat of determinism to agency depends upon the very dualism that the theory rejects.
Causation threatens agency only if the agent is something other than the causes, such that being caused means being acted upon by what one is not. If the person is a region of the causal order and not a spectator to it, then the causes running through the person are, in part, the person\'s own activity. This is the basis of compatibilist positions in Western philosophy, from Spinoza\'s (1677/1994) account of freedom as acting from an adequate understanding of one\'s causes to more recent accounts that locate the self inside the causal order (Dennett, 2003). Juarrero (1999) offers a version that is especially germane to ASE theory. Drawing from complex systems theory, she argued that intentions function as context-sensitive constraints that reshape the space of probabilities within which behavior unfolds, from within the system that is acting. No uncaused cause is necessary, and yet the intention makes a difference.
The ASE theory of change reaches a similar conclusion in its own terms. Volition is neither an uncaused act of will standing outside of the causal order nor the mere output of conditions; it is the oriented configuring of conditions in the present moment. Choice is real but never uncaused, a soft determinism in which the person\'s own orientation is counted among the causes. Should one object that liberation, on this account, is itself caused, ASE theory agrees and finds nothing lost. A causal order that includes a person\'s observation and a community\'s shared meaning-making is an order that is open to change from within it. For this reason, I have long preferred to describe observation as a type of will, in that awareness alters experience and observation creates opportunity.
Autonomy as Genuine Experience
The third objection holds that if autonomy is conditioned, then the experience of autonomy is an illusion. ASE theory treats the experience as genuine and rejects only one interpretation of it. The error is the inference from \"I experience myself as choosing\" to \"I am an unconditioned origin standing apart from my world.\" The experience itself is accurate, as it is what the meeting of conditions and orientation feels like from the inside.
Two lines of evidence support this position. First, the sense of agency has an identifiable mechanism; actions are experienced as one\'s own when their outcomes follow from one\'s own predictions, which is the case when a person\'s orientation is in fact among the causes of the outcome (Haggard, 2017). Second, the experience of autonomy is itself socially conditioned. When people act upon the explicit order of another person, as opposed to their own choice, they report feeling less responsible and show measurably reduced markers of agency (Caspar et al., 2016). In other words, the felt sense of authorship is not a constant attached to an essential self, as it expands and contracts with the conditions in which a person is situated. ASE theory would predict this finding, and it carries a liberatory implication. Schools that govern students chiefly by command might produce compliance while eroding the very experience of authorship upon which commitment depends.
This is also why ASE theory maintains what has been called the double truth. The self is not fixed, and the student\'s experience of selfhood is genuine; the environment is not essential, and the student\'s sense of being embedded in a particular world is real. To dissolve the intuition of selfhood in the name of non-dual philosophy would deprive the student of the subjectivity through which change is chosen and sustained. To treat that intuition as proof of a separate self would deprive the student of the openness through which change becomes possible.
Social Agency and the Non-Dual Environment
The agency claim refers to both personal and social agency, and non-dualism within the environment explains why the latter is not merely a metaphor. If the environment is not a fixed backdrop, then it, too, is a conditioned process with its own orientation. Institutions classify, remember, and frame on behalf of their members, thereby shaping what those members find it natural to think (Douglas, 1986). A discipline policy is an interpretation of what behavior means and what school is for, set down in rules and routines. A schoolwide practice of morning check-ins is an intention held by an institution, arranging in advance the conditions that students will inherit when they walk through the door.
From this perspective, social agency shares the structure of personal agency. A school acts through the complex total of its prior conditions (e.g., its history, resources, staffing, policies, relationships, and the persons within it) and through its orientation (i.e., the meaning it gives to students\' behaviors and the purposes it holds for them). Personal and social agency are one process at two scales, and change at either scale passes through the other. This is the reason that ASE theory has always maintained that development cultivated in a student will not be sustained in a setting that cannot hold it, and why the counselor\'s work must be reflexive, or germane to both the student and the environments the student inhabits (Lemberger & Hutchison, 2014).
Agency Extended in Time
The word establishment in the agency claim points to a temporal feature that completes the argument. Much of what is called choosing happens before the moment of choice. Research on implementation intentions demonstrates that plans in the form of \"if situation X arises, I will do Y\" link a future situation to a chosen response in advance, so that when the situation arrives the response is already near at hand (Gollwitzer, 1999). The person does not override conditions in the moment; the person takes part, earlier, in establishing the conditions that the moment will inherit.
This might be the most practical sense in which non-dualism and agency are consistent. Because the present is the emergence of prior conditions, it cannot be commanded from outside of itself, and because orientation becomes condition, the present can be influenced by what persons and communities attend to, name, practice, and arrange beforehand. ASE theory distinguishes constitution, from the Latin constitutus (i.e., set up or established), from composition, from the Latin componere (i.e., put together). Constitution is largely inherited, whereas composition is what persons and communities put together over time from what was set up. Agency in ASE theory is, in large measure, the work of composition.
Summary of the Argument
The objections and the corresponding responses from ASE theory are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Objections to the Consistency of the Foundational Claims and Responses From ASE Theory
--------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Objection Assumption on which it depends Response from ASE theory The ownerless orientation Orientation requires a subject who stands apart from experience Orientation is the direction that conditions already carry; the self is a compiler and positioner of experience, and action is intention without a doer behind it Reinstated dualism Prior conditions can be sorted into outside causes and an inside recipient The complex total cannot be divided without remainder; constitution includes internalized culture, and culture is carried in the body Illusory autonomy To be caused is to be acted upon by what one is not The person is a region of the causal order whose orientation is counted among the causes; the felt sense of authorship is accurate and socially conditioned --------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Considered together, the two foundational claims of ASE theory entail one another. Without non-dualism, the agency claim would collapse into either voluntarism, where a separate will originates action, or environmental determinism, where separate conditions dictate it. Without the agency claim, non-dualism would collapse into either quietism, where there is nothing to do because there is no one to do it, or annihilationism, where the person dissolves into the field. ASE theory holds to what its Buddhist sources would call a middle path, in that the person is neither a fixed self nor nothing at all but a conditioned pattern that contributes to further conditioning.
Implications for School Counseling Practice
Several implications follow for ASE-informed school counselors. First, responsibility is distributed without being dissolved. Because a student is a condition in the arising of her own behavior, she remains accountable for it; because she is not its only condition, the adults and institutions around her are accountable as well. ASE-informed counselors avoid language that locates a problem wholly in a student (e.g., \"he chose to walk out\") as well as language that removes the student from the account altogether (e.g., \"the system made him do it\"). A more accurate statement holds both, as in \"Walking out was the choice most available to him given the morning he had, the history he carries with this class, and how the room read him; what can we arrange so that a different choice is nearer next time?\"
Second, the counselor attends to conditions and orientation together. The counselor helps to establish personal and social conditions (e.g., a re-entry plan, a trusted adult nearby, a revised referral form, a predictable place to regroup) and also cultivates orientation through observation, so that the student can notice a choice as it emerges and consider what it means and what it is for. Neither is sufficient alone, as each becomes the other over time.
Third, the experience of authorship is itself a target of practice. If authorship is cultivated in conditions that leave room for a student\'s own predictions to become action, then plans ought to be the student\'s own, and outcomes ought to be observed and named together. Case in point, when a student and teacher both name a successful step into the hallway as Co-regulation, the meaning made of that choice becomes a condition of the next one, and the student meets that next moment more as its author than as its object.
Conclusion
ASE theory does not ask practitioners to choose between a philosophy of relational being and a practice of empowering agents, as these are the same commitment. Because self and environment are not fixed, experience is the emergence of a complex total of prior conditions. Because those conditions always arrive oriented, persons and communities take part in what they become; and because orientation settles into condition, the establishment of conditions in advance is where much of agency resides. The person who chooses is neither an uncaused origin nor a spectator to processes happening elsewhere. The student, and the school, is where conditions and orientation meet, and that meeting can be increasingly observed, shaped, and shared.
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